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Since 1972 Labor federal governments have implemented a policy 
of economic liberalisation in Australian agriculture. It was in this 
area that the Whitlam government showed itself most sympathetic 
to market liberalism. Australian agricultural economists were the 
first Australian economists to champion economic liberalisation and 
they welcomed Whitlam's initiatives. I To economic liberals all forms 
of agricultural product market regulation constitute unproductive rent 
seeking. As a result agricultural economists have shown little interest 
in examining the ideologies and forms of Labor agricultural 
regulation.2 Labour historians and activists have followed a similar 
pattern. They have taken for granted Labor's support of agricultural 
regulation, and the party's pursuit of farmers ' votes, and have argued 
over its significance. To the right it demonstrates Labor's status as a 
peoples' party, to the left it shows how Labor in government from an 
early stage privileged petty-bourgeoisie interests.3 
Agricultural policy was contested within the pre-Whitlam 
Australian Labor Party (ALP). I will demonstrate this fact by an 
examination of the agricultural policy of the NSW Labor government 
of 1930-32, with particular reference to wheat and dairy farming. In 
1930 NSW Labor campaigned heavily on agricultural issues and 
won a level of rural electoral support comparable to that of William 
McKell in 1941, an achievement neglected by McKell's admirers" 
In eighteen months of power Jack Lang's government devoted as 
much attention to agricultural policy as did McKell's government, 
which the NSW ALP right takes as the model of Labor agrarianism.s 
Despite this attention at the May 1932 election NSW Labor lost every 
rural electorate. This debacle revealed the limits of labour 
agrarianism. 
1. The two labor agrarian isms 
The competing traditions of Labor agrarianism shared an assumption 
I call 'corporatist.' Both traditions identified farmers as a group that 
shared common interests, but they diverged on how these interests 
should be identified and represented. The two competing traditions 
I identifY as pluralist and statist. 
Both traditions believed that in the free market 'middlemen' to 
the cost of both parties corrupted the simple exchange between 
producers and consumers. Both believed that a Labor government 
could establish institutions that would cut out the middleman. Both 
believed that the promise of such institutions would win farmers' 
support back from the Country Party, which (particularly in NSW) 
was constrained by its alliance with the Nationalists from fully 
supporting regulation of agricultural marketing. 6 
Statist corporatism was popular among rural party activists. It 
was expressed by Labor policy that called for co-operation 'between 
the primary producer and the producer in the industrial sphere.' It 
identified farmers as workers and believed that their distrust of 
organised labour revealed a false consciousness on their part. Farmers 
who voted Labor, and particularly those who joined the ALP, 
supported the ALP because they identified themselves as workers 
(and often also Catholics) rather than because they saw the 
ALP as best suited to represent farmers. It is a similar process 
to the tendency of white-collar Labor identifiers to identify 
themselves as working-c1ass.7 Country Labor supporters were more 
conservative than urban Labor identifiers, as shown by the collapse 
of Lang's rural support in 1932 and the greater support for Scullin 
against Lang. Their reaction against Lang in 1931-32 was not driven 
by a belief that he neglected agriculture but opposition to his 
perceived radicalism. Statist corporatists believed that the interests 
of farmers were best represented by a Labor government. They 
supported government controlled marketing organisations that 
removed middlemen, and replaced the existing farmers' organisations 
that misled their members.8 
The pluralist corporatist tradition shared a distrust of market 
forces and middlemen but it identified the interests of farmers and 
workers as potentially in conflict. Pluralist corporatists knew that 
although farmers might resent produce merchants they distrusted 
state controlled marketing organisations as inefficient and 
unresponsive.9 It sought to work with farmers' organisations, such 
as the wheatfarmer dominated NSW Farmers and Settlers Association 
(FSA). Pluralist corporatists feared that excessive union demands 
could alienate farmers, and believed that electoral success required 
that urban unionists not be granted unrestrained control of party 
policy. It was Labor parliamentarians, particularly those from rural 
electorates, who were most likely to support pluralist corporatism. 
They were likely to accept farmers' preference for producer controlled 
marketing organisations. Organised marketing would also obscure 
the transfer of income by means of higher produce prices from urban 
working-class consumers (in safe Labor seats) to farmers in marginal 
electorates. 10 Country branch members and unionists were less likely 
to support this policy than Labor parliamentarians. In 1941 McKell 
overruled country branches and centrally endorsed rural candidates 
precisely because he believed that country branches were 
unrepresentative of their electorates. II A similar pattern of 
parliamentarians driving Labor government agricultural policy was 
apparent in Queensland. This state is often presented as the bailiwick 
of Labor agrarianism, but party conferences were dominated by the 
industrial concerns of the Australian Workers' Union and agricultural 
policy was developed by ministers rather than the party.12 
In 1926-27 Lang's first government found its narrow majority 
threatened by dissident country Labor parliamentarians. To appease 
them it followed a policy of pluralist corporatism. In September 1926 
it convened a conference of 'producers and consumers' at Bathurst. 
The producers were elected from local meetings of farmers. The 
consumers' representatives were largely selected by trade unions. 
Producers outnumbered consumers. Working groups at the 
conference generally supported collective marketing with majority 
producer contro1. 13 In 1927 Labor legislation allowed farmers by a 
two-thirds majority to establish a compUlsory pool that would 
purchase all the produce of the sector from farmers and sell it to the 
pUblic. Each pool would have a five-member board, of whom three, 
including the president, were producers' representatives. 14 Of nine 
ballots (two for wheat) only one failed to reach 50%, but 
ballots of butter, millet and wheat producers failed to return a 
two-thirds majority. Boards were established only for rice, eggs and 
honey. 15 
Worldwide export prices for prices of most agricultural 
commodities declined from the mid 1920s. This decline contributed 
to and was then accelerated by the onset of the world economic slump 
from 1929. 16 This slump had a distinctive impact on the Australian 
political economy. The Australian economy had oligopolistic and 
competitive sectors. In the competitive sector farmers were price-
takers (along with women engaged in household labour) whose 
labour-force largely escaped industrial regulation, particularly that 
undertaken by family members. Urban paid workers and capitalists 
were price-setters. The reduction in aggregate demand from falling 
export prices and capital inflows impacted differently in the two 
sectors. Output was restricted to maintain price levels in the 
oligopolistic sector, but in the competitive sector output increased 
in an attempt to maintain income levels in the face offalling prices. 
Output increased further when the unemployed took up farming. 
The milk and wheat industries exemplified this. 
Wheat prices fell from 6s6d per bushel in 1924-25 to 4s3.5d in 
1929-30. The price slump impacted hardest on new and indebted 
farmers in western NSW.t7 Many struggling wheatfarmers believed 
that the FSA's affiliation to the Country Party constrained its ability 
to represent them. They formed new growers' organisations, such as 
the Wheatgrowers' Union, that claimed to be non-political. These 
farmers were unimpressed with the Country Party but they would 
not necessarily support Labor, the party of high wages and tariffs}S 
In July 1931 the Senate, controlled by the non-Labor parties, rejected 
legislation proposed by the Scullin govemment to establish a national 
wheat pool and a guaranteed minimum price for wheat. NSW Labor 
believed that wheatfarmers would punish the state coalition for the 
actions of the Senate.t 9 
The dairy industry displayed a similar pattern of overproduction 
and price deflation. Prior to legislation in 1929 prices to country 
dairyman were settled by negotiations between the country milk 
suppliers' association and the distributing companies.20 Regulation 
for health purposes of the dairy industry dated from 1886.21 In 1927 
the Lang government introduced legislation for a Metropolitan Milk 
Board on pluralist corporatist lines with four members elected by 
producers and three appointed by the government. Lang was defeated 
before the legislation was passed and the Bavin government legislated 
in 1929 for a Board of nine members. Producers elected four 
members, the five others were government appointees: a chairman, 
two representatives of consumers and two non-voting advisory 
representatives of the distributing companies. The Board was to 
regulate the supply and distribution and milk and set retail prices 
and minimum prices to producers, but unlike Labor's proposed Board 
it could not directly engage in the distribution ofmilk.22 The Board 
was unable to regulate the industry. Distributing companies evaded 
price control by claiming to be agents of farmers rather than the 
owners of the milk they sold. Dairy farmers relied largely on domestic 
labour, and were easily able to increase productionY Discount 
vendors purchased milk from dairies near Sydney and sold at all 
hours undercutting award conditions.24 Prices to farmers halved from 
November 1930 to May 1931.25 The rivalry among dairy farmers 
played into the hands of statist corporatists. In the 1930 election 
campaign Labor accused the Board of failing to confront the 
distributing companies.26 
This attack on middlemen was repeated throughout Labor's rural 
campaign and was combined with underconsumptionist economics. 
'Organised marketing' would protect the farmer as arbitration did 
the wage earner, and farmers would benefit from Labor's 
defense of consumers' living standards.27 
wheatfarmers had swung to Labor but others believed town residents 
and public employees were responsible for Labor's gains. 28 A 
statistical analysis supports the later position. The significant 
contributors to country Labor support were unemployment and 
Catholicity, rather than wheat farming. Labor's rural support was 
more socially defined than in the urban-mining region where 
Protestants and non-manual workers swung to Labor (see Table 1). 
The 1930 election gave Labor a large majority and compliant 
caucus. Lang chose as Agriculture minister William Dunn. In 1926-
27 Dunn opposed Lang's leadership of the party. He now accepted 
Lang's leadership but in policy he defended a pluralist corporatist 
position that supported producer self-government and co-operation 
with the FSA. The Health Department regulated the milk industry. 
Health Ministers James McGirr and William Ely challenged Dunn's 
pluralist corporatism. Both were Lang loyalists from urban 
constituencies, but both had personal connections to the agricultural 
sector. McGirr was a former country pharmacist, and Ely blamed 
middlemen for driving him off his farm,29 
2. The reform of marketing 
Dunn's priority in government was to work with the FSA, but its 
leadership was more sympathetic than the membership. The FSA 
supported legislation to require only a simple majority among 
producers for the formation of a marketing board.30 Dunn promised 
the FSA that there would be no alteration in the composition of 
marketing boards. 31 He defended existing boards against Labor 
parliamentarians who accused them of ignoring new producers.32 
Dunn's moderate position was displayed at the May 1931 conference 
of producers and consumers. 
Producers' delegates to the conference were elected by farmers 
rather than appointed by their organisations, but turnout at the 
meetings was low and returned members of established farmers' 
organisations. The FSA was well represented among delegates and 
its leadership welcomed the conference.33 In the conference program 
Dunn explained that the development of co-operative marketing 
would end 'inefficient marketing and distribution' and benefit both 
farmers and consumers.34 Two hundred delegates attended; 160 from 
primary industries, and 40 consumers' delegates. 35 Dunn was 
unapologetic that producers were disproportionately represented.36 
Lang promised the government would follow the advice of the 
conference. 37 Conference delegates formed subcommittees to discuss 
their industry and most supported organised marketing.38 Union 
delegates who claimed capitalism was to blame for the rural crisis 
were ignored.39 Labor believed that the conference's success showed 
farmers no longer feared the 'red bogy. '40 
The constitutional requirement of interstate free trade made 
doubtful the value of a wheat pool restricted to one state. Despite 
this the FSA supported an affirmative vote for a wheat pool under 
the amended marketing legislation in July 1931.41 Pool opponents 
argued the Lang government would control it:2 Of the 87.6% of 
farmers who voted only 42.7% voted 'yes' compared to 62.8% in 
September 1930. The affirmative vote was highest in the newer wheat 
areas to the west, where climate and wheat yields were most variable. 
The FSA leadership blamed the defeat on anti Lang feeling.43 This 
was certainly the case but the result also demonstrated that politicians, 
bureaucrats and farmer organisations, often underestimated the extent 
to which farmers would distrust any organisation that sought to 
constrain their right to sell their produce as they saw fit. 44 
3. Direct price regulation 
After the election some in the Country Party believed EJ 
Concurrent with its support of a wheat pool NSW Labor along 
with other Australian governments supported measures to 
assist wheat farmers. The initial strategy of Labor governments 
.:Iilill K~(~:: 
,!pwwlllS., 
I. IIO,rf I!~ 'II~"., " 










1111 14"i ; !l1~1~ I) 
j " 1111::01' 
t. 
Table 1 
Predictors of Lang Labor Support in Rural NSW 1930 
Intercept Women voters Catholic Unemployment Female Workforce 
1930 18.1 -1.78 10,74 0.52 1.55 
0.18 -2.77 3. 2,19 2.15 
Manual Non-manual Non-wheat Wheat Employers 
1930 0.93 1.091 0.77 1.03 -1.89 
1,06 1.07 O. 88 1.09 -3 
Predictors of Lang Labor Support in Urban-Mininq NSW 1930 
Intercept Women voters Catholic Unemployment Female workforce 
1930 149.91 -2,36 0.31. 0.271 0.28 
0.01 -3,01l 1.21 1.19 0,7 
Manual Salariat Agriculture Employers 
1930 0.44 0.D3 
1,02 0.051 
had to been to either raise a loan to assist farmers, or to secure the 
extension of Commonwealth bank credit. Both options would have 
benefited farmers without directly impacting on consumers, Once 
these options were rejected farmers could only benefit at the expense 
of consumers or the manufacturers of consumer goods. 
The Flour Acquisition Bill of March 1931 enabled the 
government to compulsorily acquire stocks of flour and then sell 
them back to the previous holder at a premium. The proceeds would 
be applied to farmers' relief. The price of acquisition was set by a 
committee representing government, flour millers and master 
bakers.45 The FSA and the Country Party welcomed higher prices 
for urban consumers.<6 Lang claimed that city unionists had accepted 
higher prices without a murmur.47 This was an overstatement. In 
caucus Dunn prevailed against those members wanted consumer 
representation on the committee setting flour prices, and for relief to 
wheat farmers to be more rigorously targeted. 48 
The legislation enabled maximum prices to be set for wheat 
products such as bread. These prices had been regulated from 1915 
to 1921. Dunn had been Agriculture minister in 1920-22 and in 1931 
he argued that the price-setting process should be as 'harmonious' 
as he believed it to have been in 1920-21.49 Despite his hope the 
issue was taken out of his hands. Labor backbenchers blamed millers 
-0.05 -3.9 
-0. II -2.9 
Association (PBA),55 The PBA supplied bread to shops to the alarm 
of the Breadcarters' Union who feared job losses.56 
In response to the Flour Acquisition Act the MBA requested an 
increase in the price of dole bread to 4.35d a loaf from the current 
price of 3.5d. Labour and Industry minister Jack Baddeley, whose 
Department was responsible for food relief in the metropolitan area, 
rejected thisP Baddeley established a committee with consumer 
representation to review bread prices. Its report agreed with the MBA 
but cabinet rejected it. 58 One option for the government would have 
been to implement party policy of establishing a state bakery, but 
the government lacked the financial resources.59 
In April 1931 flour broker Marco Shadier approached the 
government with a scheme by which he would take over from the 
MBA as the discounter of dole coupons. Shadier told the government 
that he could arrange the supply of cheap flour to bakers enabling 
dole bread to be supplied at 3.92d a loaf. The government seized on 
Shadier's offer as a means to defeat the MBA and took up his offer. 
which came into effect from 1 August 1931.60 When implemented, 
Shadier's plan was a debacle for the government. Millers boycotted 
Shadier and as a result he was unable to supply bakers with flour, 
Thousands of unemployed were left without bread.6! The government 
and Shadier blamed the flour millers and MBA, but the Bread Carters' 
and bakers for higher bread prices, rather than farmers, and they union sided with the Master Bakers and condemned the Shadier's 
found support from cabinet ministers concerned about the impactof 
higher bread prices on food relief expenditure. 50 In May 1931 bread 
supplied under food relief amounted to one eighth of the total cost 
ofrelief.5! 
The bread industry was highly monopolised. The Flour Millers 
Association (FMA) refused to supply flour to bakers who sold below 
the price set by the Master Bakers Association (MBA).52 The MBA 
paid shops for dole coupons and was refunded by the government. 
contract. 62 ALP branches rallied behind the government and 
condemned the Bread Carters' for their support 0 f the MBA. 63 The 
same week the government ran out of cash to pay public service 
salaries.64 After an acrimonious caucus meeting on 7 August the 
government canceled its contract with ShadlerY An interim 
settlement was arranged with the MBA to supply dole bread at 4s3d 
per dozen loaves.66 
The fiasco revealed the limited capacity of the state to effectively 
intervene in industry. The Colonial Secretary's Department failed to 
adequately investigate Shadier's ability to supply flour. The 
government used its powers under the Flour Acquisition Act to seize 
a shipload of export flour. This action was popular with the party, 
By the late 1920s innovations in baking technology made it easier 
for small bakeries to set up, and many unemployed entered the 
industry. 53 The MBA and the Operative Bakers Union claimed small 
bakeries undercut award conditions, but their ability to produce cheap 
bread was largely due to the use of family labour and low 
capital costs. 54 By mid 1931 a bread price war was underway 
EJ and opponents of the MBA formed the Peoples' Bakers' 
but the government had no idea what to do with it, and returned 




The settlement with the MBA provided for a review of bread 
prices for food relief. Industrial Commission Albert Piddington 
undertook the inquiry. He was strongly critical of the millers' cartel 
and recommended 4s3d a dozen or 4.25d a loaf.68 The MBA rejected 
his findings, and after further negotiations reached a settlement in 
April 1932 for a dole price of 4s6d a dozen or 4.5d a loaf. 69 
The Shadier's fiasco exemplified the dilemmas of statist 
corporatism. To take over marketing the state required capital and 
expertise. Shadier had failed to provide these and the government 
had been forced to accept the terms of the MBA. In the dairy industry 
Labor's approach was much more cautious and it sought to work 
with the distributing companies. If taken too far this approach 
threatened to make statist corporatist institutions merely the agent 
of producer and trader interests, at the expense of consumers. 
In January 1931 Health Minister McGirr pleased milk farmers 
when he refused to allow a price reduction recommended by the 
Milk Board. The Board demanded legislative reform to enable it to 
control the distributing companies' evasion of the Act.70 Labor instead 
reconstructed the Board in a statist corporatist form. It introduced 
legislation to establish a three member appointive board, called the 
'Milk Board' rather than the 'Metropolitan Milk Board'. The new 
board would comprise three government appointees; a chair and 
representatives of producers and consumers. It would be able to vest 
milk supplied for metropolitan consumption in itself, and to engage 
in milk trading on its own behalf. Minister Ely justified the bill as a 
health measure but Labor parliamentarians from dairying areas dwelt 
on the plight of farmers ruined by excessive competition.7! Some 
farmers demanded an elective board but many believed the industry 
was in such crisis that the bill should be accepted.72 The parliamentary 
opposition opposed the Board's ability to trade on its own behalf, 
but unions hoped this provision would mean nationalisation of the 
industry.73 The Bill passed the Legislative Council only after the 
appointment of25 new Labor Councillors in November.74 
The process of conciliating dairy industry interests began the 
appointment in December 1931 of Milk Board members. There was 
general surprise when the chair was E. A Hamilton, who had been a 
distributing company representative on the old Board.7s The other 
members were John Graham and J. M. Martin. Graham was a 
Maitland dairy farmer who had represented producers on the old 
Board. 76 Martin was a union organiser, Labor MLC, unsuccessful 
Labor candidate in the January 1931 Parkes by-election and brother 
of ALP organising secretary J. B. Martin.77 Farmers welcomed the 
appointment of Hamilton and Graham. They complained Martin 
lacked milk industry experience.78 The Milk Carters' were 
disappointed that a unionist from the industry was not appointed, 
but they regarded Martin as a labour representative,19 
The new Board believed that without control of all milk supplied 
for consumption in the metropolitan area, it would be unable to 
enforce payment to dairymen of the minimum prices.80 From 5 March 
1932 when the Board made its first declaration of prices it took 
possession of all milk supplied for consumption. The Board did not, 
as Ely had originally suggested, enter business on its own but 
employed existing companies as agents.8! Martin and Graham voted 
against Hamilton to ensure that more than one company was endorsed 
as agents of the Board. 82 Once delivered to an agent of the Milk 
Board milk property of the Board. It remained in physical possession 
of the distributing company, and when milk supplies reached Sydney 
the companies paid the Board for milk. The Board, rather than the 
companies, paid dairymen.83 
The Board adopted a pricing policy favourable to producers. All 
members agreed on a maximum retail price of2s4d per gallon, 
but Martin and Graham outvoted Hamilton to set a minimum 
price to the dairyman of Isld per gallon rather than the IsOd 
favoured by Hamilton. 84 Milk producers were delighted.8s The A WU, 
Federal Labor and manufacturers argued the increase was unfair to 
consumers.86 Defenders of the Board pointed to the health danger of 
cheap, but low quality milkY Martin's influence was apparent when 
the Board introduced regulations to control the hours of milk delivery, 
a po licy welcomed by the Milk Carters' Union. 88 This disadvantaged 
consumers and small non-unionised vendors.89 
Producers welcomed the activities of the Board after the milk 
war.90 The Milk Board members were the only Labor appointees 
made to a statutory authority in 1930-32 not dismissed by the Stevens 
government. A 1936 inquiry concluded that the Board privileged 
producer interests over consumers as shown by its failure to review 
prices after March 1932 despite falling costs in the industry.9! Martin's 
position was hostile to the distributing companies and sympathetic 
to unionised milk carters but not particularly to consumers. A statist 
corporatist model of regulation had pluralist corporatist outcomes 
favouring organised producers at the expense of consumers. 
Conclusion 
At the 1932 election NSW Labor lost every electorate outside of the 
urban and mining regions. Labor's record of agricultural policy 
activism in 1930-32 demonstrates this failure was not for want of 
trying. Despite Labor's appeal to milk farmers in 1930 and 1932 the 
Labor vote in Maitland was below that statistically predicted in 1930 
and 1932 by 7% and 10%. This contrasted with Murrumbidgee where 
Labor overperformed in 1930 by 7% and 1932 by 3%. Murrumbidgee 
was an electorate where Labor probably did exceptionally well among 
farmers of whom many were soldier settlers who were dependent on 
public irrigation. The decline of Labor's overperformance in 
Murrumbidgee from 1930 to 1932 illustrates the general rural reaction 
against Langism. The strong recovery in Labor's Murrumbidgee vote 
in 1935 and 1938 demonstrates that the rural reaction against Lang 
was restricted to 1931 and 1932. 
In Australia the labour movement championed a worker-farmer 
coalition based on the isolation of Australia from the world market. 
This is the strategy that some suggest European social democrats 
should have proposed in the 1930s to counter the appeal of fascism. 92 
Australian Labor's failure suggests that even if European social 
democrats had dropped their support for free trade in food they would 
not have attracted farmers. Economic hardship among farmers does 
not necessarily encourage a shift to the left on their part.93 In 1930-
32 Labor's call for regulation of agriculture and control of the 'money 
power' was met by an individualist call from some in the rural media 
for farmers to adopt new methods of management and technology.94 
Years later One Nation's pluralist corporatist appeal would face 
similar opposition. In 1987 Geoffrey Lawrence argued that the 
support by farmers' organisations for politics of economic liberalism 
opened space for the radical right to appeal to farmers. When such a 
force appeared in the form of One Nation, the National Party was 
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